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ABSTRACT: Regardless of the evolution of engineering systems and fabrication methods, recent 
major accidents exposed the risk behind modern human economic activities to an inquiring and 
perplexed society. These events brought out the fact that interactions between complex systems, 
cutting-edge technologies and human factors may trigger particular accident sequences that are very 
difficult to predict and mitigate through traditional risk assessment tools. Thus, the purpose of this 
study is to overcome barriers to dealing with complex data by translating multi-attribute events into a 
two-dimensional visualisation framework, providing means to communicate high-technology risks and 
to disclose surrounding factors and tendencies that could lead to the manifestation of human errors. 
This paper first discusses the human error and human factors role in industrial accidents. The second 
part applies Kohonen’s self-organising maps neural network theory to an accident dataset developed by 
the authors, as an attempt to improve data exploration and classify information from past events. 
Graphical interfaces are then generated to produce further insight into the conditions leading to the 
human errors genesis and to facilitate risk communication among stakeholders.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Perspectives on human errors 
Human error is a term coined in numerous fields, 
such as engineering, management, design, 
economics, psychology, sociology and 
philosophy, for different purposes. From a 
general perspective, it can be commonly defined 
as a failure to perform a certain task that leads to 
an adverse consequence, whereas the 
understanding of the relationship between 
humans, tasks, technologies, organisations and 
the surrounding environment is usually called 
“Human Factors”.  The growth of this applied 
discipline as a way to improve human reliability 
at work and enhance systems’ safety is closely 
associated with the development of human error 
studies and understanding. However, the 
interdisciplinary nature of this subject allows for 
some controversy regarding the use of the term 
“error” to define human underperformance. 
Hollnagel (1998) believes that the term human 
error is misleading, pointing out some differences 
among the views of engineers, psychologists and 
sociologists, and thus in terms of meaning. 
Basically, he claims that engineers tend to 
analyse humans as a component that can be 
successful or fail to complete a task, while 
psychologists generally try to understand the 
mental mechanisms that led to the erroneous 
action. Sociologists usually search for an 
explanation related to the socio-technical system, 
and errors can be attributed to a management 
problem, incorrect training or social pressure. 
Another compelling aspect of Hollnagel’s 
argument is that the term error is currently used 
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to define the cause (when accidents are said to be 
due to human error), the event (when an action, 
e.g. the early activation of a switch, is said to be a 
human error) or the consequence (when the 
outcome of the action is said to be an error, e.g. 
the driver made the error of fuelling with diesel 
instead of petrol, inferring a car malfunction). So, 
how can we communicate risks intimately 
associated with human performance, without a 
common ground regarding its definition, 
understanding and handling? 
Notwithstanding this, Reason (2013) has 
recently reaffirmed his former definition for the 
term, emphasising three basic characteristics to 
define error: plans, actions and consequences, 
surrounded by two situational factors: intention 
and absence of chance interference (e.g. an act of 
God). This view is particularly useful to tie up 
two loose ends: firstly, the need for a common 
understanding of human error, a deeply rooted 
term in both technical and general public reality, 
serving as a useful bridge between the two 
worlds; and secondly, a clear and convenient 
definition, focused on the characteristics of the 
analysed subject and on the genesis of error, to 
facilitate communication among authorities, the 
general public and wider stakeholder groups. 
1.2. Echoes from recent high-technology, multi-
attribute accidents 
The significance of human factors to industrial 
domains was extensively highlighted by current 
studies. Graeber (1999) portrayed human error as 
a major contributor to more than 70% of 
commercial airplane hull-loss accidents. 
According to Dhillon (2007), the United 
Kingdom Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Club 
reported costs of US$541 million per year for the 
marine industry due to human error. 
Likewise, the chairman of the independent 
investigation commission appointed to 
investigate the Fukushima nuclear disaster that 
occurred in March 2011, Mr. Kiyoshi Kurokawa, 
during the presentation of his final report, pointed 
out that the tsunami was not the sole cause of the 
accident, regarding cultural issues and human 
factors as vital contributing factors (Kurokawa et 
al, 2012): "What must be admitted – very 
painfully – is that this was a disaster 'Made in 
Japan'. Its fundamental causes are to be found in 
the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture 
(…). Therefore, we conclude that the accident 
was clearly 'man-made'”. 
Undoubtedly, this accident triggered a 
worldwide commotion, and the information 
released to the general public caused Japanese 
public opinion and the international community 
to perceive the nuclear industry as unsafe.  
It is important to notice that the interaction 
between operators, technology and organisation 
is also a common issue during the information 
release from investigations of high-technology 
accidents. The final report of the Bureau 
d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de 
l’aviation civile (2011) on the AF-447 Rio-Paris 
flight accident described an apparently simple 
equipment defect (i.e. ice blockage of the Pitot 
probes) due to a design failure, resulting in an 
inconsistency of speed parameters. This 
deficiency triggered several human-related events 
(wrong system diagnosis and inappropriate 
control inputs, among others) which led to 228 
fatalities and the loss of the Airbus A-330 in 1st 
June 2009. Besides, this emblematic investigation 
report has also stressed some features such as the 
de-structuring of the task-sharing during the 
response to the abnormal event, the lack of 
training in manual aeroplane handling in high 
altitudes, and the absence of a clear display of the 
airspeed inconsistencies in the cockpit, exposing 
an intricate combination of factors leading to the 
disaster. 
The examples above highlight the 
complexity behind erroneous actions, mental 
models, technology, organisational issues, culture 
and the environment in high-technology 
industries, posing a significant challenge to how 
industry, governments and regulatory bodies will 
learn from these multi-attribute events and 
translate it into an approachable scheme to 
communicate risks appropriately. Moreover, 
high-impact accidents usually attract the utmost 
public and media attention, and the government 
capacity to maintain a reliable network to cope 
with asymmetries of information is naturally 
exceeded. 
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Therefore, this work aims to overcome 
barriers to dealing with complex data by means 
of applying an unsupervised learning neural 
network algorithm to an accident dataset 
developed by the authors, generating two-
dimensional graphical representations of the 
multi-attribute events. The graphical interface 
will provide innovative means to communicate 
high-technology risks and to disclose surrounding 
factors and tendencies that could lead to the 
manifestation of human errors. 
2. DATA SOURCE AND ANALYSIS 
METHOD 
2.1. The Accidents Database - Multi-attribute 
Technological Accidents Dataset (MATA-D) 
Complex industrial accidents are multi-attribute 
events, and many specific interactions are 
necessary to generate undesirable consequences. 
These attributes are usually exposed after 
laborious and sensitive investigations following 
serious events, the reports from which can be 
considered a very important source of accidents 
data. However, despite the considerable number 
of institutions responsible for investigating 
accidents and issuing recommendations to 
minimise the possibility of similar occurrences, 
the unavailability of a suitable dataset on human 
performance to consolidate data and promote 
profounder predictions is a significant bottleneck 
highlighted by Swain (1990) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (1990), 
among other academic and professional 
institutions. Attempts to reduce this bottleneck, 
such as the CORE-DATA database developed by 
Gibson and Megaw (1999), have not prospered 
so far, due to several complications, e.g. 
accessibility, taxonomy limitations and updating 
issues.  
To overcome these issues and assuming that 
one of the primary methods to better understand 
multi-attribute events is to analyse data from past 
accidents, a Multi-attribute Technological 
Accidents Dataset (MATA-D) was developed by 
the authors, to highlight common features and 
reveal comparable conditions under which 
serious accidents may occur.  Major accident 
reports from numerous industrial sectors were 
classified under a common framework based on 
Hollnagel’s (1998) Cognitive Reliability and 
Error Analysis Method (CREAM) taxonomy, 
which allows up to 53 different attributes per 
event. Further data collection and usage 
restrictions, as well as an extensive description of 
CREAM are widely explored by Moura et al 
(2015). Currently, the MATA-D contains 216 
industrial accidents. 
2.2. Data clustering using Self-Organizing Maps  
A well-stablished clustering method has been 
applied in this work in order to support the data 
exploration process and to disclose relevant 
associations within the MATA-D multi-attribute 
dataset. Self-Organizing or Kohonen’s Map 
(SOM) is an unsupervised learning neural 
network algorithm created by Teuvo Kohonen, 
which provides simplified visualisation (usually 
two-dimensional) of multi-dimensional data, in a 
way that similar models are mutually attracted 
and associated with adjacent grid nodes in a 
topographic map.  
Basically, the network is trained with the 
definition of the best matching unit (BMU) in the 
output space, defined as the one that minimises 
the Euclidean Distance ‖ − ‖  between each 
input pattern x and output node mi (Eq. (1)). 
	
 = arg min
Ω
‖	
 − 	
‖  (1) 
A neighbourhood function hci will define the 
spatial influence of the BMU, attracting adjacent 
nodes to the BMU in the output space, and all the 
neighbours nodes will be successively updated 
following the Eq. (2).  This sequence will be 
repeated (through iterations) until the map 
converges (Kohonen, 2001).      
	
 + 1 = 	
+∝ 	
ℎ	
 − 	
 (2) 
The method is considered to be amongst the most 
relevant unsupervised learning algorithms 
(Araujo and Rego, 2013). It has been extensively 
used for data mining, clustering applications, to 
visualise large datasets and for dimensionality 
reduction (Cottrell et al, 2009, Hammer, 
Gisbrecht and Schulz, 2013, Kohonen, 2013).  
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The fact that SOM’s learning process is 
designed not to be affected by external influence 
can be extremely helpful in this specific research, 
as it avoids potentially biased concepts and 
prevents excessively subjective interpretations 
during the analysis of circumstances which leads 
to the genesis and perpetuation of human errors.  
3. THE MATA-D EXPLORATION USING 
SELF-ORGANISING MAPS 
3.1. SOM Input Data 
As an attempt to go beyond data statistical 
analysis and gain further insight into the 
relationship among contributing factors leading 
to accidents, the Self-Organising Maps was 
applied in this work, using the MATA-D as input 
data.   
According to Kohonen (2013), the usage of 
a variant of the Eq. (2) updating rule is 
recommendable for practical applications, to 
eliminate convergence complications and 
generate steadier asymptotic mi values. 
Consequently, he developed the batch-learning 
version of SOM (Batch-SOM) expressed in Eq. 
(3), which will be applied in the current dataset, 
to generate more robust results. 

∗ =  
∑  !"!#$%&&&!
∑  !"!#!
   (3) 
Therefore, in the practical case, the learning 
factor ∝  was no longer necessary, with the 
codevectors being updated once, rather than in a 
recursive fashion. Each ∗ is the centroid of the 
influence region defined by '(  (the mean value of 
x(t)), the neighbourhood function and the number 
of samples )* . 
Maps were generated from the 216 records 
with 49 attributes each, as four CREAM 
categories were not found in any event, i.e. 
Cognitive Style, Sound, Humidity and Other. The 
width of the kernel (the radius of the 
neighbourhood function) was 0.75, and the 
output space was trained with 84 batches. 
3.2. SOM Results 
The expert version of Viscovery® SOMine 
software was used to produce maps and enhance 
graphical visualisation. A quality measurement 
for different cluster numbers, which indicated the 
chosen grouping as a possibly good clustering 
(highest quality indicator factor), was used to 
favour the resulting arrangement shown in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1: SOM Clustering Results 
 
Table 1: Clusters main characteristics 
Cluster Events #  
Factors # 
Min  Max  Mean Median Mode 
C1 50 04 19 08.6 08 08 
C2 52 01 11 04.3 04 04 
C3 53 01 05 02.7 03 02 
C4 36 05 20 09.4 09 09 
C5 25 06 24 11.3 10 10 
 
Table 2: Factors incidence per cluster 
Factor C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
Wrong Time 0.380 0.058 0.019 0.028 0.320 
Wrong Type 0.260 0.173 0.019 0.083 0.080 
Wrong Object 0.020 0.038 0.000 0.056 0.000 
Wrong Place 0.060 0.288 0.000 0.528 0.840 
Observation missed 0.260 0.154 0.019 0.000 0.440 
False Observation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.160 
Wrong Identification 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.120 
Faulty diagnosis 0.160 0.038 0.000 0.111 0.560 
Wrong reasoning 0.200 0.038 0.000 0.278 0.160 
Decision error 0.120 0.154 0.000 0.028 0.160 
Interpretation delay 0.080 0.038 0.000 0.056 0.120 
Incorrect prediction 0.060 0.019 0.000 0.111 0.000 
Inadequate plan 0.160 0.096 0.019 0.028 0.240 
Priority error 0.140 0.115 0.000 0.028 0.040 
Memory failure 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Fear 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.000 0.080 
Distraction 0.040 0.019 0.000 0.028 0.400 
Fatigue 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.160 
Perform. variability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.120 
Inattention 0.020 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.120 
Physiological stress 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.028 0.000 
Psychological stress 0.020 0.038 0.000 0.056 0.080 
Functional impairmt. 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cognitive bias 0.100 0.038 0.000 0.083 0.280 
Equipment failure 0.820 0.231 0.925 0.611 0.080 
Software fault 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.160 
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Poor procedure 0.440 0.423 0.038 0.778 0.840 
Access limitations 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.080 
Ambiguous info 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.080 
Incomplete info 0.200 0.058 0.000 0.167 0.440 
Access problems 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.040 
Mislabelling 0.000 0.019 0.019 0.028 0.000 
Communic. Failure 0.260 0.038 0.019 0.056 0.240 
Missing information 0.200 0.135 0.057 0.583 0.080 
Maintenance failure 0.420 0.058 0.283 0.833 0.280 
Poor quality control 0.820 0.173 0.472 0.972 0.720 
Managemt. problem 0.180 0.019 0.019 0.194 0.160 
Design failure 0.860 0.423 0.472 0.833 0.760 
Poor task allocation 0.620 0.577 0.132 0.972 0.920 
Social pressure 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.222 0.160 
Insufficient skills 0.720 0.212 0.057 0.361 0.720 
Insuffic. knowledge 0.600 0.154 0.057 0.639 0.400 
Temperature 0.020 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.040 
Illumination 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.000 
Adv. ambient cond. 0.040 0.173 0.075 0.056 0.000 
Excessive demand 0.020 0.077 0.000 0.056 0.200 
workplace layout 0.020 0.038 0.000 0.028 0.080 
Poor team support 0.040 0.019 0.000 0.056 0.120 
Irreg. working hours 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.240 
 
 
Table 1 summarises the main characteristics of 
the generated clusters, while Table 2 presents 
factors frequency results (minimums in italic, 
maximums in bold) per cluster.  
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
4.1. Clustering Interpretation 
The first cluster comprises 50 accidents, 23.28% 
of the dataset. Design Failure (86%) highest 
incidence is grouped with two specific execution 
factors, Wrong Time and Wrong Type, which 
attained their maximum clustering values (38% 
and 26%, respectively), indicating that in-built 
design deficiencies seem to have prompted basic 
execution errors (timing, duration, force, 
distance/magnitude, speed or direction).  
A specific cognitive function related to 
planning, namely Priority Error, showed strong 
similarity with the Wrong Type execution factor, 
while Communication Failure (26%) was linked 
to the Wrong Time factor. Also, the significance 
of the organisational factor Insufficient Skills can 
be highlighted, which reached its maximum 
figures (72%). An example of graphical analysis 
of the isolated factors’ SOM is shown through 
the comparison between Figures 2 and 3, where 
the relationships above mentioned can be 
depicted, providing further support to risk 
communication.  
  
Figure 2: Wrong Time SOM 
 
Figure 3: Communication Failure SOM 
 
Therefore, design failures appear to directly 
affect planning cognitive functions, leading to 
very basic erroneous actions due to some human 
performance failure or equipment mishandling 
(lack of skills). This scenario is aggravated by 
communication gaps, when the message does not 
reach the intended receiver. Several “timing” 
erroneous actions (Wrong Time factor) were 
combined with communication deficiencies to 
decisively contribute to serious events. The Piper 
Alpha accident is one of the most acknowledged 
examples of this identified interaction, in which 
pumps were started before the conclusion of 
maintenance works due to poor communication 
between shifts (Cullen, 1990), clearly concurring 
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with the findings depicted in the Figures 2 and 3 
above. 
The Adverse Ambient Conditions factor 
attained its maximum level in Cluster 2 (17.3%), 
and the analysis leads to an association with 
Design Failure and Equipment Failure. For this 
group, design seems to have failed to cope with 
foreseeable adverse ambient conditions, resulting 
in some kind of equipment failure. 
Accidents within cluster 3 are strongly 
characterised by the Equipment Failure 
technology factor, with 92.5% of frequency. 
However, the grouping shows 53 accidents 
encompassing one to five factors, with low mean, 
median and mode values. It means that the 
majority of accidents have limited identified 
factors leading to the undesirable outcome. 
Fundamentally, the main finding which can be 
extracted from the analysis is that Inadequate 
Quality Control and Design Failure are more 
associated with Equipment Failure (and to be 
regarded as its cause) than a Maintenance 
Failure. Although further assumptions regarding 
this group might be unsupported, due to the low 
amount of straight recognisable relationships 
among features, it is possible to suggest that 
some strong evidence found during an accident 
investigation (such as an equipment failure) may 
influence the event’s examination process as a 
whole (being considered the main or direct cause) 
and override the search for further underlying 
causes. 
Cluster 4 is largely dominated by the 
Inadequate Quality Control (97.2%), Inadequate 
Task Allocation (97.2%) and Maintenance 
Failure (83.3%), being also apparent a high 
frequency of the Design Failure factor, with 
83.3% of incidence. Insufficient Knowledge 
(63.9%) and Missing Information (58.3%) 
reached their maximums, and Permanent 
Interface technological problems (Access 
Problems and Mislabelling) related to design are 
noticeable too. 
Specific cognitive functions related to 
interpretation (Wrong Reasoning and Incorrect 
Prediction) are strongly associated to the 
Insufficient Knowledge factor, emphasising a 
lack of understanding of the current situation or 
being not certain about the action that should be 
performed. The Missing Information factor high 
incidence means that information provided by 
organisations within the group is generally 
lacking, incorrect or misunderstood. Hence, 
communication issues seem to have poisoned 
these organisations, being largely reflected by the 
Inadequate Task Allocation, Inadequate Quality 
Control and Maintenance Failure maximum 
figures, and disclosing an asynchrony between 
organisation of work, task planning, managerial 
rule and the information available. 
 
Figure 4: Wrong Reasoning SOM 
 
Figure 5: Insufficient Knowledge SOM 
 
Figure 4 topographic similarities with Figure 5 
highlight the relationship between Wrong 
Reasoning and Insufficient Knowledge, and the 
2001 American Airlines Flight 587 accident, 
which resulted in 265 fatalities, illustrates this 
strong connection. According to the investigation 
report (NTSB, 2004), pilots were not aware of 
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the existing structural protection level when full 
or abrupt flight control inputs are made at 
airspeeds below the manoeuvring speed 
(Insufficient Knowledge) and the first officer 
associated wake turbulence encounters with the 
need for aggressive roll upset recovery 
techniques (Wrong Reasoning, i.e. deduction 
error). 
Cluster 5 shows a very robust presence of 
the Wrong Place erroneous action factor, with 
84% of frequency. This sequence factor is 
combined with all three categories of cognitive 
functions: (i) Observation (Observation Missed, 
False Observation and Wrong Identification); (ii) 
Interpretation (Faulty Diagnosis, Decision Error 
and Delayed Interpretation) and (iii) Planning 
(Inadequate Plan), in addition to the highest 
incidence of Temporary and Permanent Person 
Related Functions.  
Consequently, this cluster is indisputably the 
most significant in terms of human-related 
features and it is intensely associated with 
Technology issues, especially Inadequate 
Procedure (84%) and Incomplete Information 
(44%) as well as Working Conditions 
organisational factors, which were all significant 
for this group. 
These features indicate that deficient 
technology information (from interface – 
warnings, alarms and indications – and from 
procedures – ambiguous, incomplete, incorrect or 
mismatched with reality) required for the safe 
operation of systems boosted difficulties to 
identify signals, events or measurements which 
should have prompted a suitable action. As a 
result, the wrong system diagnosis led to a wrong 
action sequence issue (omission, jump forward, 
jump backwards and extraneous actions). 
4.2. Final Remarks 
The possibility of reducing a 216-event dataset 
with 49 attributes each to a two-dimensional map 
is a noteworthy feature taken from the SOM 
algorithm, which permitted the translation of 
extremely intricate data into a friendly interface 
to communicate high-technology risks to 
stakeholders, support findings and assist the 
decision-making process. Furthermore, the usage 
of a techno-social framework such as the 
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
to organise and create the MATA-D dataset, 
followed by a mathematical method to explore 
data and disclose surrounding factors and 
tendencies, provided a very useful common 
ground for cross-disciplinary understanding of 
risks and allowed the visualisation and 
interpretation of case studies from the real world. 
Clustering and nodal analysis indicated that 
design must anticipate the skills and knowledge 
level that should be required from operators, 
possibly providing some training 
recommendations to minimise interpretation and 
mental planning issues leading to execution 
errors. Skills are usually linked to practical 
experience, thus setting up on-the-job trainings 
with senior instructors seems to be a reasonable 
alternative. Relevant technology information 
(from interface and procedures) must be 
identified and assessed in terms of adequacy, 
focusing on how some missing information could 
induce erroneous human actions or inhibit correct 
actions during operations, directing at 
arrangements prone to be affected by sequence 
issues. The establishment of a specific method to 
maintain communication channels, to improve 
the message format and to timely deliver the 
required information is vital for the organisation 
of work, task planning and managerial rule. Also, 
the quality of accident investigations involving 
equipment failures is an issue that deserves 
additional attention by managers. A strong 
indication (e.g. an equipment failure) might 
induce a biased conception from investigators 
towards a final conclusion, without further 
reflection concerning deeper underlying causes 
and contributing factors. Those conclusions from 
the dataset are naturally visualised and 
communicated with the use of a graphical 
interface, considering that the algorithm has 
perfectly conserved the input factors in the output 
space, allowing further interpretation of isolated 
factors.   
4.3. Future Developments 
The clustering analysis based on Self-organising 
Maps algorithm confirmed the link between 
  8
human-related features and other dataset relevant 
factors which figured frequently, such as 
inadequate quality control, equipment failure, 
inadequate task allocation and training, indicating 
a pathway for further investigation. Future 
research could also focus on the usage of 
graphical methods to communicate risks to 
specific stakeholder groups, such as the 
workforce – as a tool to improve awareness and 
allow them to recognise potentially hazardous 
patterns – or the general public, to depict past 
accident data in an approachable way and reduce 
information asynchronies. 
Furthermore, other datasets such as the 
ASRS (Aviation Safety Reporting System) could 
be solely used or integrated with the MATA-D to 
produce further insight.   
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